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P Bolton
 
 
*
1 Introduction 
* 
 
 
Over the last decade the procurement procedures of government have received 
increasing attention in the courts and academic literature. As yet, however, 
there has been little analysis of the committee system for competitive bids 
created in legislation for the procurement of goods and services by 
government.1
                                            
*  This material is based upon work supported financially by the National Research 
Foundation. 
** Associate Professor of Law, University of the Western Cape, South Africa. 
1  For an overview of the committee system for competitive bids in local government, see 
Steytler and De Visser Local Government Law 14-23 to 14-29.  
 One of the reasons for this is that it is only after organs of state, 
and in particular municipalities, have begun to implement the bid committee 
system in their day-to-day practices that it is clear that problems are arising. In 
recent months, the courts have increasingly been faced with issues revolving 
around the implementation of the bid committee system. This article is timely in 
that it will critically analyse the relevant legislative provisions in light of all the 
cases that have thus far involved the bid committee system at local government 
level. Even though legislation for national and provincial government provides 
for the use of the committee system for competitive bids, and in certain 
respects the relevant provisions correspond with those that apply to local 
government, there are significant differences. A thorough analysis and 
comparison of the provisions that apply at all three levels of government will 
result in too lengthy an article. The committee system for competitive bids at 
national and provincial level will accordingly be examined elsewhere and this 
article will be confined to local government. Most of the cases that have thus far 
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dealt with the bid committee system, moreover, do so from a local government 
perspective.  
 
As background, an overview will be given of the legal framework for public 
procurement at local government level. In doing so, the focus will be on the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa,2 in particular section 217, the 
Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act,3 and Regulations,4 the Local 
Government: Municipal Finance Management Act (MFMA)5 and the Municipal 
Supply Chain Management Regulations (MSCM Regulations).6 Next, the use of 
competitive bidding, also generally known as a public call for tenders, and the 
committee system will be discussed. The roles of each committee in the bidding 
process will be examined, including the rules that apply to the composition of 
each committee. Attention will also be given to the supervisory role of the 
municipal manager over the different committees. The relevant legislative 
provisions will be critically analysed and reference will be made to applicable 
case law. Of particular interest will be the recent case of Actaris South Africa 
(Pty) Ltd v Sol Plaatje Municipality, Intelligent Metering Systems (Pty) Ltd.7
                                            
2  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996. Hereafter the Constitution. 
3  Act 5 of 2000. Hereafter the Procurement Act. 
4  Preferential Procurement Regulations GG 22549 of 10 August 2001. 
5  Act 56 of 2003. 
6  Local Government: Municipal Finance Management Act (56/2003): Municipal Supply 
Chain Management Regulations GG 27636 of 30 May 2005. There is, of course, also other 
legislation that applies to local government and that would be relevant for public 
procurement, eg, the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000, as amended 
by Act 44 of 2003, the Local Government Laws Amendment Act 51 of 2002, and the Local 
Government: Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998, as amended by Act 1 of 2003. There 
are, moreover, the Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000, the Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 and the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt 
Activities Act 12 of 2004 that also apply to public procurement procedures. A detailed 
examination of this legislation falls outside the scope of the article, but where relevant 
reference may be made thereto. 
7  Actaris South Africa v Sol Plaatje Municipality, Intelligent Metering Systems (1357/2007) 
[2008] ZANCHC 73 (12 December 2008). Hereafter Actaris South Africa (Pty) Ltd case. 
 The 
court in this case interpreted a number of the legislative provisions dealing with 
the roles and composition of the different committees. 
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2 The legal framework for public procurement in local government  
2.1 Constitution 
The legal regulation of public procurement in South Africa is constitutionalised. 
Section 217 of the Constitution provides that organs of state, and this includes 
municipalities and municipal entities,8 must contract for goods or services in 
accordance with a system that is fair, equitable, transparent, competitive and 
cost-effective. Municipalities and municipal entities are not prevented, however, 
from implementing a procurement policy that provides for categories of 
preference in the award of contracts and the advancement of persons or 
categories of persons disadvantaged by unfair discrimination. Such preferential 
procurement policy must be in accordance with national legislation that 
provides a framework for its implementation. Provision is therefore made in the 
Constitution for the use of procurement as a policy / empowerment tool. The 
principles of fairness, value for money (competitiveness and cost-effectiveness) 
and transparency are, furthermore, internationally regarded as the cornerstone 
of good procurement practice.9
                                            
8  See s 217(1) which refers to organs of state in the national, provincial and local sphere of 
government. See also s 239 of the Constitution for the definition of an organ of state. A 
municipal entity is defined in s 1 of the Municipal Systems Act as "(a) a private company 
[established by one or more municipalities or in which one or more municipalities have 
acquired or hold an interest]; (b) a service utility; or (c) a multi-jurisdictional service utility". 
A service utility, in turn, refers to a body established under s 86H of the Act and a multi-
jurisdictional service utility refers to a body established under s 87 of the Act. The notion of 
ownership control by the government therefore appears to be the overriding criterion. 
 Their inclusion in the Constitution is therefore 
commendable, because organs of state are bound by the most essential 
elements of a good procurement system whenever they contract for goods or 
services. Sections 215-219 of the Constitution further impose a responsibility 
on the National Treasury to introduce norms and standards within government, 
thereby ensuring transparency and expenditure control measures. 
9  See the Government Procurement Agreement at WTO 1996 www.wto.org/ and the Model 
Law on Procurement of Goods, Construction and Services at UNCITRAL 1994 
www.uncitral.org/ 
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2.2 Procurement Act and Regulations 
The Procurement Act has been enacted to provide a framework for the use of 
procurement as a policy tool as required by section 217 of the Constitution.10 
The Act applies to a list of organs of state, which includes municipalities.11 The 
Minister of Finance may recognise any other institution included in the definition 
of an organ of state in section 239 of the Constitution.12 As yet, however, there 
has been no recognition of municipal entities as organs of state for the 
purposes of the Procurement Act.13 They are, accordingly, not subject to the 
Procurement Act and Regulations. Municipalities must (however) use the 
framework provided in the Act and Regulations and may not adopt a more 
generous preferential procurement policy unless the Minister of Finance directs 
otherwise.14 The Procurement Act and Regulations create a point system for 
the evaluation and adjudication of bids in terms of which points are awarded on 
the basis of price (sometimes also functionality) and the attainment of two 
specific goals for preference purposes. First, preference may be afforded to 
persons or categories of persons historically disadvantaged by unfair 
discrimination on the basis of race, gender or disability, and second for the 
implementation of government's Reconstruction and Development (RDP) 
Programme.15
                                            
10  The Procurement Act and Regulations are currently (7 May 2009) in the process of being 
redrafted with the aim to bring them more in line with the Broad-Based Black Economic 
Empowerment Act 53 of 2003 (BBBEEA).  
11  See s 1(iii) of the Act. 
12  S 1(iii)(f) of the Procurement Act. 
 For contracts between R30 000 and R500 000 the 80/20 point 
system applies and in terms of it bidders are awarded points out of 80 for price 
and points out of 20 for preference. For contracts above R500 000 the 90/10 
point system applies, with points out of 90 for price and points out of 10 for 
13  This information is based on a search conducted on LexisNexis, Butterworths databases 
available at http://butterworths.uwc.ac.za/ See also Penfold and Reyburn "Public Procure-
ment" 25-14.  
14  Reg 2(2). 
15  S 2(1)(d) of the Procurement Act. See further reg 17(3) which lists a number of RDP goals 
which include, inter alia, the promotion of South African owned enterprises, the creation of 
new jobs or the intensification of labour absorption, and the promotion of enterprises 
located in rural areas. 
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preference. A contract must be awarded to the bidder scoring the highest points 
in terms of the relevant point system unless there are objective criteria that 
justify the award of the contract to another bidder.16
2.3 MFMA and MSCM Regulations 
 
 
At local government level specific legislation deals with financial management 
and expenditure control as required by the Constitution. The MFMA, inter alia, 
aims "[t]o secure sound and sustainable management of the financial affairs of 
municipalities and other institutions in the local sphere of government".17 
Chapter 11 of the Act deals with supply chain management (SCM) and 
provides that each municipality and each municipal entity must have and 
implement a supply chain management policy (SCMP) that falls within the 
framework for SCM created in the Act.18 An SCMP must provide for a system of 
SCM that is fair, equitable, transparent, competitive and cost-effective,19 thus 
reiterating the principles in section 217 of the Constitution. An SCMP must also 
comply with a prescribed regulatory framework, which must cover the list of 
matters specified in section 112(1) of the MFMA. Such regulatory framework 
must further be fair, equitable, transparent, competitive and cost-effective.20
The framework for an SCMP has been captured in the MSCM Regulations 
issued by the National Treasury in 2005. In terms of the Regulations an SCMP 
must make provision for effective systems for demand management, 
acquisition management, logistics management, disposal management, risk 
management, and performance management.
  
 
21
                                            
16  For more detailed discussion and analysis see Bolton Government Procurement in South 
Africa ch 10. See also Steytler and De Visser (n 1) 14-10 to 14-13; Penfold and Reyburn 
(n 13); Watermeyer 2000 PPLR; Gounden Affirmative Procurement Policy. 
17  See the Preamble to the Act. 
18  S 111. 
19  S 112(1). 
20  S 112(2). 
21  Reg 9(b). 
 The focus of this article will be 
on the rules that apply to acquisition management because this is where the 
committee system for competitive bids comes into play. In terms of the 
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Regulations an SCMP must provide for four types of acquisition / procurement: 
petty cash purchases for contracts up to R2000; written or verbal quotations for 
contracts over R2 000 and up to R10 000; formal written price quotations for 
contracts over R10 000 and up to R200 000; and competitive bidding for 
contracts over R200 000 and long term contracts, that is, contracts with a 
duration of more than one year.22 Where competitive bidding is used the 
committee system applies and this will be the focus in the next paragraph and 
the rest of the article. It is important to note, however, that an SCMP may allow 
the accounting officer, who is the municipal manager in the case of a 
municipality,23 to apply the committee system also to formal written price 
quotations.24
3 Competitive bidding and the committee system 
 
 
 
As noted, a municipality must make use of competitive bidding for contracts 
over R200 000 as well as for long term contracts. A competitive bidding 
process generally consists of different stages and in terms of the MSCM 
Regulations, an SCMP must provide for procedures for each of the stages, that 
is, the compilation of bid documentation, the public invitation of bids, site 
meetings or briefing sessions where necessary, the handling of bids after 
submission, the evaluation of bids and the award of contracts, and the 
administration of contracts and proper record keeping.25
                                            
22  Reg 12(1) read with reg 1. 
23  S 60 of the MFMA provides that "[t]he municipal manager of a municipality is the 
accounting officer of the municipality for the purposes of this Act, and, as accounting 
officer, must - (a) exercise the functions and powers assigned to an accounting officer in 
terms of this Act; and (b) provide guidance and advice on compliance with this Act to - (i) 
the political structures, political office-bearers and officials of the municipality; and (ii) any 
municipal entity under the sole or shared control of the municipality". 
24  Reg 26(3). 
25  Reg 20.  
 A committee system 
must be in place to oversee the different stages and must consist of at least a 
bid specification committee, a bid evaluation committee and a bid adjudication 
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committee.26 The municipal manager (as accounting officer of the municipality) 
must appoint the members of the different committees and no councillor may 
be a member or attend as an observer.27 An SCMP must also provide for the 
appointment by the municipal manager of an attendance or oversight process 
by a neutral or independent observer when this is necessary to ensure fairness 
and transparency.28 An SCMP may further, as noted above, allow the municipal 
manager to apply the committee system to formal written price quotations.29
3.1  Bid specification committee  
 
Regulations 27, 28 and 29 then deal with the different committees. 
 
3.1.1 Legislative provisions 
The bid specification committee (BSC) is responsible for the compilation and 
drafting of specifications for the procurement of goods and services by the 
municipality or municipal entity.30 The committee must consist of one or more 
officials of the municipality or municipal entity and "preferably" the manager 
responsible for the function involved.31 The committee may also, when 
appropriate, include members who are external specialist advisors.32 Persons, 
advisors or corporate entities who participate in the BSC or the directors of 
such corporate entities are, however, prohibited from bidding for any resulting 
contracts.33 The bid documentation prepared by the BSC must take into 
account the General Conditions of Contract, any Treasury Guidelines and the 
requirements of the Construction Industry Development Board if the bid relates 
to the construction, upgrading or refurbishment of buildings or infrastructure.34
                                            
26  Reg 26(1)(a). 
27  Reg 26(1)(b) read with s 117 of the MFMA. See Ortlieb & Associates v Camdeboo Local 
Municipal Council and Others 2005 JDR 0408 (E) where the court set aside the award of a 
bid because a councillor chaired the bid committee. 
28  Reg 26(1)(c). 
29  Reg 26(3). 
30  Reg 27(1).  
31  Reg 27(3). 
32  Reg 27(3). 
33  Reg 27(4).  
34  Reg 21(a). 
 It 
must further require sufficient information from bidders in their bids, in particular 
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the identification of the bidder and information relating to tax matters; whether 
the bidder, any of its directors, managers, principal shareholders or 
stakeholder, or spouse, child or parent of the bidder or directors, managers, 
principal shareholders or stakeholder is or has been in the service of the state 
in the past 12 months.35 Bid documentation must require bidders to "declare 
any conflict of interest they may have in the transaction for which the bid is 
submitted".36 Additional information must further be provided where the value of 
the transaction is expected to exceed R10 million, that is, (i) the bidder's annual 
audited financial statements for the past three years (or since establishment if 
established in the last three years); (ii) a certificate stating that the bidder has 
no undisputed commitments for municipal services towards a municipality or 
other service provider in respect of which payment is overdue for more than 30 
days; (iii) particulars of any contracts awarded to the bidder by an organ of 
state in the past 5 years (and particulars with regard to any material non-
compliance or dispute regarding the execution of such contract); (iv) a 
statement whether it is expected that any portion of the goods or services will 
be sourced from outside South Africa and if so, the portion and whether 
payment for that portion will be transferred outside South Africa.37 The 
documentation must also stipulate that disputes must be resolved by means of 
mutual consultation or mediation and as a last resort a South African court of 
law.38
Insofar as the actual drafting of specifications is concerned, the MSCM 
Regulations provide that specifications must be drafted in an unbiased manner 
to allow all potential bidders to participate.
 
 
39
                                            
35  Reg 13. 
36  Reg 21(c). 
37  Reg 21(d). 
38  Reg 21(e). 
39  Reg 27(2)(a).  
 Specifications "must take account 
of any accepted standards such as those issued by Standards South Africa, the 
International Standards Organisation, or an authority accredited or recognised 
by the South African National Accreditation System with which the equipment 
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or material or workmanship should comply".40 Specifications must, where 
possible, be described in terms of performance required rather than descriptive 
characteristics for design.41 They "may not create trade barriers in contract 
requirements in the forms of specifications, plans, drawings, designs, testing 
and test methods, packaging, marking or labeling or conformity certification".42 
Specifications "may not make reference to any particular trade mark, name, 
patent, design, type, specific origin or producer unless there is no other 
sufficiently precise or intelligible way of describing the characteristics of the 
work, in which case such reference must be accompanied by the words [sic] 
'equivalent'".43 They "must indicate each specific goal for which points may be 
awarded in terms of the point system set out in the [SCMP] of the municipality 
or municipal entity"44 including the criteria required by the Procurement Act, 
BBBEEA and the Construction Industry Development Board Act.45 The 
municipal manager must approve the specifications prior to the publication of 
the invitation for bids.46
3.1.2 Analysis 
  
 
                                            
40  Reg 27(2)(b). 
41  Reg 27(2)(c). 
42  Reg 27(2)(d). 
43  Reg 27(2)(d). 
44  Reg 27(2)(f). 
45  Act 38 of 2000. Reg 21(b) read with reg 1. 
46  Reg 27(2)(g). See further National Treasury 2006 www.finance.gov.za/ par 2, which 
stipulates that that if and when required to do so, the bid adjudication committee may 
consider for approval the recommendations of the BSC. This may be done to ensure that 
the need for the particular goods or services forms part of the strategic goals and 
objectives as stated in the municipality's Integrated Development Plan; a suitable and 
unbiased specification is compiled for the particular requirement; proper terms of reference 
are drafted for the service required clearly indicating the scope of the requirement, the 
ratio between price and functionality, the evaluation criteria and their weights and values; 
strategic sourcing principles were applied and that the market was properly researched 
and analysed; the necessary funds are available in the approved budget; where 
appropriate, Special Requirements and Conditions of Contract are specified in addition to 
the General Conditions of Contract; the preference point system and appropriate goals are 
identified and the points allocated for these goals are consistent with the requirements of 
the Procurement Regulations; and where appropriate, ranges have been set which 
indicate the breakdown of points or the percentages as provided for in the relevant sliding 
scales for the selected specified goals. 
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The provisions relating to the drafting of specifications would generally ensure 
the fair treatment of bidders and competition that is sufficiently wide. Slanted 
specifications would clearly defeat fairness, transparency and competition and 
the use of trade names, etc. may unnecessarily limit competition. Transparency 
in the award of points for the attainment of specific goals further promotes 
informed participation by interested parties and enhances the integrity of the bid 
process. It is, of course, also important to guard against bias and the 
appearance of bias in the bidding process. Requiring bidders to declare any 
conflict of interest they may have in the transaction for which the bid is 
submitted, and to declare whether they or certain persons linked to them are or 
have been in the service of the state serves this purpose. Preventing outside 
persons or entities who participate in the BSC as specialist advisors from 
bidding for contracts also guards against bias and the appearance of bias. On a 
critical note, however, the Regulations stipulate that the manager responsible 
for the function involved should "preferably" be a member of the BSC. 
Reference is further made to "officials" of the municipality or municipal entity 
without specifying from which departments these officials should be. It is 
submitted that the Regulations should be more specific with regard to the 
membership of the BSC and make it compulsory for at least one of the 
members to be from the relevant department requiring the goods or services. 
Bidders will prepare their bids based on the specifications and as will be 
explained shortly, the bid evaluation committee is bound by the specifications 
advertised and must evaluate bids in accordance with the specifications. The 
drafting of the specifications is therefore of utmost importance and it is simply 
logical for the members of the BSC to be composed of at least one member 
from the relevant department who is familiar with the department's needs. Such 
member should then, where possible, be the manager of the relevant 
department. Further reasons for this recommendation will emerge from the 
discussion that follows. 
 
3.2 Bid evaluation committee 
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In dealing with this committee the relevant legislative provisions will first be 
discussed. An analysis will then follow of the provisions relating to the 
composition of the committee, the binding nature of the bid specifications 
advertised and the disqualification of bidders. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2.1 Legislative provisions 
The bid evaluation committee (BEC) is responsible for the evaluation of bids 
submitted in response to a public invitation for bids.47 The committee must, as 
far as possible, consist of officials from the departments requiring the goods or 
services and at least one SCM practitioner of the municipality or municipal 
entity.48 The evaluation of bids must be done in accordance with the 
specifications for the particular procurement and the points system as set out in 
the municipality or municipal entity's SCMP and the prescripts of the 
Procurement Act.49 The committee must evaluate the "ability" of each bidder to 
execute the contract.50 Even though the meaning of the term "ability" is not 
defined in the Regulations, depending on the nature of the contract, it would 
generally require a consideration of: the nature, quality and reliability of the 
product or service to be rendered;51 the experience and track record of the 
bidder;52 the technical knowledge and capacity of the bidder; the possession of 
appropriate licenses and permits;53
                                            
47  On the rules that apply to such public invitation, eg, methods of publication, time periods 
and closing date, and the handling, opening and recording of bids, see reg 22 and 23. See 
also Bolton (n 16) 155-156, 192-193; Steytler and De Visser (n 1) 14-25 to 14-26. 
48  Reg 28(2).  
49  Reg 28(1)(a). 
50  Reg 28(b). 
51  Trepte Public Procurement in the EC 162. 
52  Ibid. 
53  Schooner 2004 PPLR 213. 
 the ability of the bidder to comply with the 
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delivery schedule;54 the bidder's record of business ethics and integrity;55 and 
the availability of tools or equipment for the bidder's use.56 It would, of course, 
also be important to take into account the price of the different bids and in doing 
so, to have regard to the overall price, namely, running costs, maintenance 
costs and rates charged per unit.57 The committee may also have regard to the 
commitment of the bidder with respect to spare parts and after-sales service;58 
the number of staff employed by the bidder;59 and where relevant, the 
qualifications and competence of the personnel of the bidder.60 The committee 
would, moreover, have to determine the bidder's entitlement to preference in 
terms of the applicable point system and the preference goals advertised. Once 
a preferred bidder is identified based on the applicable point system, the 
committee must check whether such bidder's municipal rates and taxes and 
municipal service charges are in arrears.61 Should this be the case, the 
committee would elect the next best preferred bidder and follow the same 
procedure, that is, checking tax related matters, etc. The committee must then 
submit to the bid adjudication committee (BAC) a report and recommendations 
regarding the award of the bid or any other related matter.62 As a rule, the BEC 
must recommend the highest scoring bidder as preferred bidder and if not, it 
must justify its recommendation to the BAC.63 The BEC may, moreover, 
conclude that no award should be made, but again it would have to provide 
reasons to the BAC for this.64
                                            
54  Ibid. 
55  Ibid. 
56  Trepte (n 51) 162. 
57  This is also referred to as life cycle costing. 
58  Trepte (n 51) 162. 
59  Ibid, 54.  
60  Ibid, 162. 
61  Reg 28(c). 
62  Reg 28(d). 
63  See s 2(1)(f) of the Procurement Act and reg 9 of the Procurement Regulations. 
64  Reg 10(4) of the Procurement Regulations makes provision for the cancellation of a bid 
process prior to the award of bids if "(a) due to changed circumstances, there is no longer 
[a] need for the goods or services tendered for; or (b) funds are no longer available to 
cover the total envisaged expenditure; or (c) no acceptable tenders are received". "An 
acceptable tender" is defined in s 1 of the Procurement Act as "any tender which, in all 
respects, complies with the specifications and conditions of tender as set out in the tender 
document". 
 Overall, the municipal manager retains a 
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supervisory role over the BEC and may at any stage refer the BEC's 
recommendation back to it for reconsideration.65
3.2.2 Composition of the BEC 
  
 
The MSCM Regulations contain no provisions prohibiting members of the BSC 
from being members of the BEC. Strictly speaking therefore this is allowed. The 
National Treasury,66 however, recommends that whenever possible member-
ship of the BSC and BEC should not overlap. It is, furthermore, logical for the 
members of the BEC to be composed of officials of the department requiring 
the goods or services as required by the Regulations.67 The court in Actaris 
South Africa (Pty) Ltd68
                                            
65  Reg 29(6) of the MSCM Regulations.  
 emphasised this. The municipality in this case had 
concluded a three-year contract with Actaris Measurement and Systems (Pty) 
Ltd (Actaris M & S), an associate of the applicant (Actaris), for the supply of 
pre-payment vending software and hardware for the provision of electricity. 
During the three year period, and with the agreement of the municipality, 
Actaris replaced Actaris M & S as service provider and when the contract came 
to an end, the parties agreed that it would run on a month-to-month basis. In 
the meantime, the municipality called for bids for four different contracts. 
Khatima Engineering Services (KES) was appointed to conduct a technical 
evaluation of the bids and in its initial report it recommended four companies for 
short-listing, that is, Actaris, IMS, Netgroup and Conlog. KES then asked the 
short-listed companies for further information and conducted site visits. 
Representations were made by the companies and thereafter KES 
recommended the award of three of the four contracts to IMS. KES did not 
make any recommendation with respect to one of the contracts (relating to 
maintenance and management) because the services under this contract would 
effectively be provided in the execution of the other contracts by IMS. The cost 
and management accountant of the municipality then calculated the price of 
66  National Treasury 2005 www.treasury.gov.za/ par 4.5.5.2.1. 
67  Reg 28(2)(a). 
68  See n 7 supra. 
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each bid and the points scored for functionality, price and specific contract 
participation goals. The BEC and BAC of the municipality "considered" the bids 
and both recommended IMS as the preferred bidder for the three contracts. 
The municipal manager made the final decision and awarded the contracts to 
IMS.  
 
Actaris applied to court for the review and setting aside of the decisions of the 
municipality to award the contracts to IMS and asked the court to refer the 
adjudication of the bids back to the municipality for reconsideration in 
accordance with section 2(1)(c) of the Procurement Act and Regulations, and 
paragraph 27(1) of the municipality's SCMP. It argued, inter alia, that none of 
the members of the BEC had technical expertise and that it was unclear 
whether the committee was, as far as possible, composed of "officials from 
departments requiring the goods or services" as required by the municipality's 
SCMP and the MSCM Regulations.69 It argued that there was non-compliance 
with section 6(2)(b) of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act70
The court found that even though two persons from the relevant electricity 
department, that is, the Chief Electrical Engineer (seconded to the municipality 
by Eskom) and the Chief Superintendent: Testing and Metering were both 
 in that a 
"mandatory and material procedure or condition prescribed by an empowering 
provision was not complied with". Actaris therefore effectively relied on 
Regulation 28(2)(a) of the MSCM Regulations which provides, insofar as 
relevant, that "[a BEC] must as far as possible be composed of … officials from 
departments requiring the goods or services". The municipality argued that 
Actaris was disqualified from further consideration for the one contract because 
it did not meet the 60% threshold for functionality, which was one of the bid 
conditions. Actaris was also not awarded the other two contracts because it 
was outscored by IMS.  
 
                                            
69  Par 35, emphasis original. 
70  Act 3 of 2000. 
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present at the meeting of the BEC, they were not members of the committee. 
They had no voting power and could not take part in the decision-making 
process. There was also no reason why it was not possible in terms of the 
municipality's SCMP for at least one of them to be members of the BEC. The 
municipality further failed to provide any explanation as to why any of the other 
members of the electricity department were not members of the BEC. The 
result was that none of the members of the BEC were officials from the 
department.71
These words must be read in context and the intention quite clearly was that, 
should such  officials be available for appointment as members, at least one 'must' 
serve as a member for the purpose of at least those meetings where decisions will 
be taken and recommendations will be made which would affect the particular 
department.
 The court held that the words "must as far as possible" in 
paragraph 27(2) of the SCMP, which reiterates Regulation 28(2) of the MSCM 
Regulations, were peremptory: 
 
72
There is [also] absolutely no reason why the composition of these committees 
could not be revised from time to time, depending on the nature of the [bids] to be 
considered and the departments to be affected, and the provisions of the policy 
and the regulations cannot be interpreted in any other way.
 
 
73
                                            
71  Par 42-44. 
72  Par 48, emphasis original. 
73  Par 50. 
 
 
The court therefore afforded peremptory status to paragraph 27(2) of the SCMP 
and Regulation 28(2)(a) of the MSCM Regulations with respect to the 
membership of the BEC and that membership must hail from the department 
requiring the goods or services. This can be commended. The rules relating to 
the appointment of BEC members are there to ensure that, amongst other 
things, the department requiring the goods or services has an opportunity to 
participate in the decision-making process since it is directly affected by the 
outcome of the award. It is, as the court stated, crucial for the relevant 
department to play a role in the decision making process. The officials of the 
relevant department would be best placed to assess the merits of the bids and 
their inclusion would promote the principles underlying bid processes. 
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3.2.3 The binding nature of the specifications  
The BEC is, as noted, bound by the specifications for the particular 
procurement; bids must be evaluated in accordance with the specifications.74 
This is, of course, important to ensure the fair treatment of bidders and 
compliance with the principle of transparency. The whole rationale behind 
competitive bidding may be defeated where changes are made to the 
specifications, conditions or the rules that have been laid down for conducting 
the process such as qualification, selection or adjudication criteria, or 
procedural rules relating to formalities for bids. The precise impact of such 
changes is examined in greater detail below75
In Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality v Afrisec Strategic Solutions (Pty) Ltd
 when attention is given to the 
supervisory role of the municipal manager over the three committees. The 
rationale behind competitive bidding would, furthermore, be defeated if after a 
public call for bids, a municipality is allowed to conclude a contract(s) with the 
preferred bidder that differ from the specifications advertised.  
 
76
                                            
74  MSCM reg 28(1)(a). 
75  Par 3.4. 
76  Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality v Afrisec Strategic Solutions 2008 JDR 1014 (SE). 
 the 
court, at the instance of the municipality, set aside agreements concluded with 
the preferred bidder (Afrisec) on the ground that they exceeded the scope of 
the bid invitation and the specifications advertised. The municipality had called 
for bids for an asset risk analysis and design of a security master plan for the 
municipality. A main agreement was concluded with Afrisec and thereafter a 
number of "scope of work agreements" (SOW's). When the municipality 
subsequently called for bids for the provision of security alarm systems and 
goods, Afrisec threatened the municipality with litigation unless the municipality 
withdrew the invitation. Afrisec argued that it had, in terms of the main 
agreement with the municipality, certain rights with regard to not only the 
analysis, design and monitoring of the security master plan, but also its 
implementation. The court agreed with the municipality that only one of the 
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agreements concluded with Afrisec (SOW 1) conformed to the bid invitation and 
confirmed its validity. All the other agreements, including the main agreement, 
exceeded the scope of the bid invitation, the bid submitted by Afrisec and the 
letter accepting such bid. Afrisec submitted a bid of about R2.7 million, but at 
the date of the application to court the final agreements were already in the 
region of R12 million. In light thereof the court found that the conclusion was 
"inescapable":77 the relevant agreements were invalid because they exceeded 
the scope of the original bid.78 The municipality's bid invitation did not state that 
the invitation was for the implementation of the general security plan. Afrisec's 
bid price was for the design of the security plan in the sum of R803 000 and 
R80 000 per month for monitoring. Its bid price did not contain a fixed or 
ascertainable amount for the implementation of the general security plan. The 
municipality moreover accepted Afrisec's bid for the analysis and design of a 
security plan and not for its implementation.79
Bid specifications can, of course, also be said to create a legitimate expectation 
on the part of bidders that the municipality calling for bids will consider and 
evaluate bids based on the specifications advertised. The Supreme Court of 
Appeal in Metro Projects CC and Another v Klerksdorp Local Municipality and 
Others
  
 
80
                                            
77  Par 20. 
78  Slightly different reasoning was applied by the court with respect to one of the agreements 
(SOW 2) because the dispute with regard to SOW 2 was based on different grounds. 
Afrisec had argued that a different bid process preceded SOW 2. The agreement was 
nevertheless set aside because it too exceeded the scope of the bid invitation. See par 25-
26 of the case. 
79  For detailed discussion and analysis of the case, see Bolton 2009 JSAL. 
80  Metro Projects v Klerksdorp Local Municipality 2004 1 SA 16 (SCA). 
 stressed the value of municipalities abiding by the criteria 
(specifications) provided in bid documents. In this case, a contract was 
awarded to a bidder who had been given an opportunity by a municipal official 
to supplement its bid after the closing date to ensure acceptance. The court 
held that this deception "stripped the [bidding] process of an essential element 
of fairness: the equal evaluation of [bids]. Where subterfuge and deceit subvert 
the essence of a [bidding] process, participation in it is prejudicial to every one 
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of the competing [bidders] whether it stood a chance of winning the [bid] or 
not".81 The Procurement Act also defines an "acceptable tender" as one that "in 
all respects complies with the specifications and conditions of tender as set out 
in the tender document".82 In this respect, the court admitted that "[t]here are 
degrees of compliance with any standard and it is notoriously difficult to assess 
whether less than perfect compliance falls on one side or the other of the 
validity divide". In the present case, however, the court found that "there is no 
difficulty. The offer put before [the decision-making body] was not the one made 
in [the second respondent's bid]. It was not one elicited by the specifications 
and [bid conditions]".83
3.2.4 Disqualification of bidders  
 The award of the contract to the second respondent 
was as a result set aside. 
 
The MSCM Regulations, as noted, provide that the preferred bidder's payment 
of municipal rates and taxes etc. must be checked.84 This is important because 
the non-payment of these may result in the disqualification of such bidder. 
Regulation 38(1)(d)(i) provides that an SCMP must enable a municipal 
manager to reject any bid from a bidder whose municipal rates and taxes and 
municipal service charges are in arrears for more than three months. The 
courts have, however, indicated that the decision to disqualify or recommend 
the disqualification of a bidder for the non-payment of taxes should not be taken 
lightly. In Imvusu Trading 134 CC and Another v Dr Ruth Mompati District 
Municipality and Others85
                                            
81  Par 14. 
82  Par 15. 
83  Par 15. 
84  Reg 28(c). 
85  Imvusu Trading 134 v Dr Ruth Mompati District Municipality 2628/08 [2008] ZANWHC 46 
(20 November 2008). 
 the municipality invited bids for the second time for 
the provision of water metered connections and precast toilets for 450 stands in 
Huhudi after its first call for bids attracted no interest. The BEC recommended 
to the BAC that the bid be awarded to the applicant even though it was ranked 
second, because the first ranked bidder, the fifth respondent, furnished an 
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outdated tax clearance certificate. The BAC, however, "sent the documentation 
back [to the BEC]" in order for the fifth respondent's tax status to be verified.86 
The fifth respondent was then allowed to replace its outdated certificate with a 
new one and was awarded the bid. The applicants argued that the conduct of 
the bid committees contravened section 217 of the Constitution in that the 
process was not fair, transparent, competitive and cost-effective. They 
accordingly asked the court to review and set aside the award of the bid to the 
fourth and fifth respondents.87 The court referred to a number of Supreme 
Court of Appeal decisions which confirm the following principles: a tender board 
may condone some deficiencies;88 a bona fide mistake should not in and of 
itself disqualify a bidder;89 substance should prevail over form;90 a distinction 
should be drawn between a material factor and the evidence needed to prove 
that factor;91 regard must be had to the facts as a whole in the context of the 
applicable legislation and the principles involved; and the words "acceptable 
tender" in the Procurement Act involves a consideration of the degree of 
compliance with bid conditions.92 The court then held that in the present case 
there was no doubt that the fifth respondent's tax clearance certificate was at all 
times in order and that the only problem was that it failed to provide proof 
thereof at the closing date for bids. The court held that allowing the fifth 
respondent to supply proof of its tax status amounted to the correction of a 
bona fide mistake, which the fifth respondent had made and did not render the 
process unfair, uncompetitive or not transparent.93
                                            
86  Par 5. 
87  Par 6. 
88  Referring to Millennium Waste Management v Chairperson Tender Board: Limpopo 
Province [2008] 2 All SA 145 (SCA) par 58. 
89  Referring to Millennium Waste Management v Chairperson Tender Board: Limpopo 
Province [2008] 2 All SA 145 (SCA) par 58; Total Computer Services v Municipal 
Manager, Potchefstroom Local Municipality 2008 4 SA 346 (T). 
90  Referring to Minister of Social Development v Phoenix Cash & Carry – Pmb [2007] 3 All 
SA 115 (SCA). 
91  Ibid. 
92  Par 7 and 8. Referring to Metro Projects v Klerksdorp Local Municipality 2004 1 SA 16 
(SCA) par 15. 
93  Par 16 and 17. 
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The court in Actaris South Africa (Pty) Ltd also confirmed the functions of the 
different parties and committees involved in that case with respect to the 
(general) disqualification of bidders.94 As explained, Actaris had been 
disqualified from the award of one of the contracts on the ground that it failed to 
meet the functionality requirement for the contract as stipulated in the bid 
conditions. The court noted that neither KES (which was appointed to conduct a 
technical evaluation of the bids) nor the cost and management accountant (who 
calculated the price of each bid and the points scored for functionality, price 
and specific contract participation goals) had the power or authority to disqualify 
bidders. KES had to recommend the award of technical points and the cost and 
management accountant had to copy the overall points to a spreadsheet to 
enable the BEC and BAC to consider the bids. The BEC could also not 
disqualify any bidder. It could simply make recommendations to the BAC who 
could in turn, also not disqualify any bidders. In casu, the BAC had to make 
recommendations to the municipal manager who had the power and authority 
to make the final award.95 The court in Entsha Henra BK v Hessequa 
Munisipaliteit96 also confirmed that the decision to disqualify bidders is the 
prerogative of the municipal manager. The mayoral committee in this case 
excluded the applicant (an unsuccessful bidder) from future contract 
opportunities on the ground of bribery. The court held that the mayoral 
committee's decision to exclude the applicant was invalid. Only the municipal 
manager could take this decision.97
In addition to disqualification for the non-payment of municipal rates and taxes 
and municipal service charges, and for not complying with specified bid 
conditions, there are also other legislative grounds for the disqualification of 
bidders. Examples include (i) unsatisfactory performance under a previous 
public contract in the past 5 years provided that notice of such unsatisfactory 
 
 
                                            
94  For the facts of the case, see section 3.2.2 supra. 
95  Par 124-128. 
96  Entsha Henra v Hessequa Munisipaliteit 2008 JDR 0455 (C). Hereafter Entsha Henra BK. 
97  For more detailed discussion and analysis, see Bolton 2008 Local Government Bulletin. 
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performance had been given to the bidder;98 (ii) the preferred bidder or any of 
its directors committed a corrupt or fraudulent act in competing for the particular 
contract;99 (iii) the preferred bidder or any of its directors abused the SCM 
system of the municipality or municipal entity or committed improper conduct 
with respect to such system;100 (iv) the preferred bidder or any of its directors 
has been convicted or fraud or corruption in the past 5 years;101 (v) the 
preferred bidder or any of its directors neglected, reneged on or failed to 
comply with a public contract in the past 5 years;102 and / or (vi) the preferred 
bidder or any of its directors has been listed in the Register for Tender 
Defaulters under section 9 of the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt 
Activities Act.103 Most of these grounds for disqualification have been 
considered elsewhere and will not be canvassed again.104
3.3 Bid adjudication committee 
 Suffice it to say that 
even though the MSCM Regulations do not expressly provide for this, it can be 
inferred from the Regulations that these matters should be checked by the BEC 
to enable it to make an informed decision when recommending a preferred 
bidder to the BAC. 
 
In dealing with this committee the relevant legislative provisions will first be 
discussed. An analysis will then follow of the provisions relating to the 
                                            
98  MSCM reg 38(1)(d)(ii). See Renaissance Security and Cleaning Services v Rustenburg 
Local Municipality (1811/2007) [2008] ZANWHC 29 (19 August 2008). (The court held that 
MSCM reg 38(1)(d)(ii) is couched in peremptory terms. As such, it placed an obligation on 
the municipality to inform the applicant of its bad track record failing which the municipality 
could not rely on such bad track record as justification for refusing to award the bid to the 
applicant who was the highest scoring bidder. The court found that the municipality had 
failed to provide proof of communications with the applicant concerning its unsatisfactory 
performance under a previous contract and accordingly set aside the award of the bid to 
the second highest bidder). For more discussion and analysis, see Bolton 2009 Local 
Government Bulletin.  
99  MSCM reg 38(1)(e). 
100  MSCM reg 38(1)(g)(i). 
101  MSCM reg 38(1)(g)(ii). 
102  MSCM reg 38(1)(g)(iii). 
103  Act 12 of 2004. Reg 38(1)(g)(iv).  
104  See Bolton (n 16) ch 13. For disqualification on the ground of corruption, in particular, see 
Williams and Quinot 2007 SALJ. 
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composition of the committee and the consideration of the BEC's report and 
recommendations. 
 
3.3.1 Legislative provisions 
The bid adjudication committee (BAC) must consider the report and 
recommendations of the BEC.105 Depending on the system of delegations in 
place, the BAC must either make a final award or it must make a 
recommendation to the municipal manager to make the final award.106 If the 
BAC does not make a final award or recommend a preferred bidder to the 
municipal manager, it must make another recommendation to the municipal 
manager as to how the relevant procurement should proceed.107 The 
membership of the BAC must be composed of at least 4 senior managers of 
the municipality or municipality, which must include the Chief Financial Officer / 
CFO (or if the CFO is not available another manager in the budget and treasury 
office who reports directly to the CFO and who is designated by the CFO), at 
least one senior SCM practitioner who is an official of the municipality or 
municipal entity, and a technical expert in the relevant field who is an official of 
the municipality or municipal entity if such expert exists.108 The municipal 
manager must appoint the chairperson of the BAC109 and if the chairperson is 
absent from a meeting, the members who are present must elect one of them 
to preside over the meeting.110
In considering the report and recommendations of the BEC, the BAC must act 
independently from the BEC. The MSCM Regulations prohibits a member of 
the BEC or an advisor or person assisting the BEC from being a member of the 
 
 
                                            
105  Reg 29(1)(a). The BAC should also "consider and rule on all recommendations / reports 
regarding the amendment, variation, extension, cancellation or transfer of contracts 
awarded" (National Treasury 2006 www.finance.gov.za/ par 2). 
106  Reg 29(1)(b)(i). 
107  Reg 29(1)(b)(ii). 
108  Reg 29(2).  
109  The National Treasury suggests that where possible, the chairperson of the BAC should 
be the CFO (National Treasury 2006 www.finance.gov.za/ par 3). 
110  Reg 29(3). 
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BAC.111 Since the BAC acts independently from the BEC, the BAC may reject 
the recommendation of the BEC and award the bid to another bidder. It is 
suggested that this could happen if, for example, the BAC is of the view that the 
BEC's recommendation does not sufficiently indicate that all relevant factors 
have been taken into account, and the recommendation does not symbolise a 
logical, justifiable conclusion based on all relevant information at the BEC's 
disposal. Prior to awarding the bid to the new preferred bidder, however, the 
BAC must check that the new preferred bidder's municipal rates, taxes and 
municipal service charges are not in arrears; and it must notify the municipal 
manager of its decision.112 The municipal manager may then, "after due 
consideration of the reasons for the deviation, ratify or reject the decision of the 
[BAC]".113 If the municipal manager rejects the decision of the BAC, he or she 
may refer the decision back to the BAC for reconsideration.114 Since the 
decision falls within the discretion of the municipal manager, however, he or 
she may also make the final award. In such a case the municipal manager 
must, in writing, within 10 working days notify the Auditor-General, the relevant 
provincial treasury and the National Treasury, and in the case of a municipal 
entity also the parent municipality, of the reasons for deviating from the 
decision of the BAC.115 There is, however, no duty to report if the decision of 
the BAC is rejected in order to rectify an irregularity in the process.116
                                            
111  Reg 29(4). 
112  Reg 29(5). 
113  Reg 29(5)(b)(i). 
114  Reg 29(5)(b)(ii). 
115  Reg 29(7) read with s 114(1) of the MFMA. 
 The 
116  S 114(2) of the MFMA. See Steytler and De Visser (n 1) 14-29 who note that s 114 of the 
MFMA "signals the ultimate distrust in the participation of the political organ of the 
municipality in the procurement process; the council is totally excluded from the decision-
making and the municipal manager's decision is not subject to the review of the council. 
Oversight is then effected by external organs of state. In the case of the Auditor-General, 
compliance with the SCM policy (and the MFMA and [MSCM] Regulations) forms part of 
the annual audit and the report would invite special attention to the award of that tender. 
Should the National Treasury have any concerns, it may seek to stop a conditional grant if 
the funds are being used for the procurement. Within the constitutional scheme of 
supervision, the provincial treasury may be the only organ of state that may act decisively. 
It may exercise the province's general monitoring powers to examine the circumstances of 
the award and intervene where an executive obligation has not been met. The province 
may give a directive that the award may not be awarded if an executive obligation has not 
been complied with (for example, if one of the many procedural requirements has not been 
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municipal manager moreover exercises a general supervisory role over the 
BAC (and also the BEC as noted above) and may at any stage of the bidding 
process refer a recommendation of the BAC back for reconsideration.117
3.3.2 Composition of the BAC 
  
 
It is, of course, important for there to be no overlap in the membership of the 
BEC and BAC. It would simply be illogical for the same persons who make 
recommendations on the award a bid to also consider and approve those 
recommendations. In practice, it is foreseeable that it may be necessary for a 
member(s) of the BEC to present the BEC's report and recommendations to the 
BAC and to clarify any uncertainties. In doing so, however, it is important to 
ensure that such member(s) have no voting power on the BAC.118 The court in 
Actaris South Africa (Pty) Ltd further stressed the importance of having a 
technical expert as member of the BAC where such expert exists within the 
municipality. Actaris had argued that the BAC of the municipality was not 
properly composed; there was no indication that "any person serving on [the 
BAC] had technical expertise" as required by the municipality's SCMP and the 
MSCM Regulations.119 Actaris therefore effectively relied on MSCM Regulation 
29(2)(iii) which provides, insofar as relevant, that "[a BAC] must consist of at 
least four senior managers of the municipality or municipal entity which must 
include – … a technical expert in the relevant field who is an official of the 
municipality or municipal entity, if the municipality or municipal entity has such 
an expert". In this respect the court found that even though the Chief Electrical 
Engineer and the Chief Superintendent: Testing and Metering were "technical 
expert(s) in the relevant field", they were (also) not members of the BAC.120
                                                                                                                               
met). If the municipal manager fails to comply with the directive, the province may resort to 
court action" (footnotes omitted).  
 
117 Reg 29(6). See further National Treasury 2006 www.finance.gov.za/ par 3-6 on the 
composition of the BAC and the appointment of members, the duties and powers of the 
various committee members, meeting procedures, and the conduct of committee 
members. 
118  See also National Treasury 2006 www.finance.gov.za/ par 4.5. 
119  Par 35 in the case, emphasis original.  
120  As noted in section 3.2.2, they were not members of the BEC. 
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There was no reason why at least one of them could not be a member of the 
BAC and the other a member of the BEC. The court held that the phrase "if 
such an expert exists" in paragraph 28(2)(c) of the SCMP, which reiterates 
MSCM Regulation 29(2)(iii), is peremptory: 
 
When the provisions of that paragraph are viewed in context it is clear that, where 
such an expert official is available, he or she 'must' be appointed for the purposes 
of at least that particular meeting where a [bid] which falls within his or her field of 
expertise is going to be considered.121
The court held that the bids in casu were of a highly technical and specialised 
nature and the municipality failed to put forward any reason or explanation as to 
why the relevant peremptory provisions of the SCMP (and ultimately the MSCM 
Regulations) were not complied with.
 
 
122 It was clear that this non-compliance 
"may have had a prejudicial effect on the activities of [the] committees and the 
conclusions reached by them".123
                                            
121  Par 64, emphasis original. 
122  Referring to MSCM reg 28(2)(a) and 29(2)(iii). 
123  Par 66. 
 The fact that none of the members of the 
committees were from the electricity department also meant that a decision was 
made that affected the department in circumstances in which the department 
never had the opportunity to participate in such decision. The BAC also did not 
have the benefit of any technical explanations or advice. The court held that the 
municipality had an obligation to ensure that both the BEC and BAC were 
properly constituted and that decisions were properly taken. In casu, the 
municipal manager did not comply with the requirements for the appointment of 
the members and the composition of the committees. The result was that when 
the decisions were taken to disqualify Actaris for not meeting the functionality 
requirement in respect of one of the contracts and to award the three contracts 
to IMS, the BEC and BAC were not properly constituted. The court held that for 
these reasons alone the award of the contracts to IMS could be set aside 
because in terms of section 6(2)(b) of the Promotion of Administrative Justice 
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Act "mandatory and material" empowering provisions were not complied 
with.124
3.3.3 Consideration of the BEC's report and recommendations  
 
 
The BAC must consider the report and recommendations of the BEC and, in 
this respect, the judgment in Actaris South Africa (Pty) Ltd is once again 
relevant. The court focused in great detail on the proceedings of the BAC in this 
case and held that the BAC meeting had been convened and conducted with 
undue and inexplicable haste. The BEC meeting took place on the same day as 
the BAC meeting and concluded late in the afternoon. On the facts before the 
court it further appeared that the BAC meeting took place immediately after the 
BEC meeting with the result that the BAC meeting in all probability ended after 
normal office hours. Moreover, on the same day that the BAC made its 
recommendation to the municipal manager, the municipal manager 
"considered" it and made a final decision. The municipal manager also wrote a 
letter to IMS informing it of its success in the bid process the very same day. 
This too, the court held, would have been done after normal office hours and 
with seemingly undue haste. The members of the BAC were further led to 
believe that they had to come to a decision urgently. From the facts of the case, 
however, it was not clear why this was done.125
                                            
124  Par 71. 
125  Par 72-77. 
 The court found that even 
though the requirement in bid procedures is for the BEC to meet first and to 
then make a recommendation to the BAC, the notice of the meeting of the BAC 
in casu stated that the meeting would commence at 14h00 whereas the notice 
of the meeting of the BEC stated that that meeting would commence at 14h30 
the same day. It was also clear that only part of the proceedings of the BAC 
meeting was recorded. The municipal manager explained that the reason why 
the BAC met immediately after the BEC had concluded its meeting was "to 
expedite a tender decision" and because "[t]he contract with Actaris had 
already been extended twice and the continuation of this state of affairs was not 
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desirable".126 The court found this explanation "improbable" and "extremely 
difficult" to believe because the contract with Actaris was extended on a month-
to-month basis until the end of August 2007, which at the time was three 
months away.127
The court, moreover, found that the BAC was not provided with a written report 
or recommendations by the BEC. On the facts before the court it appeared that 
at the meeting of the BAC, a member of the BEC (Mr B) was present and that 
he "highlight[ed] a few (conditions) that was (sic) mentioned" at the BEC 
meeting.
 Actaris was also not informed of the outcome of its bid in the 
same urgent way as IMS was informed of its success.  
 
128 The BAC was, in other words, not provided with the contents of the 
deliberations, conclusions and recommendations of the BEC. It also appeared 
that when questions were asked at the BAC meeting regarding the award of the 
contracts to IMS, such questions were never answered. At least one of the 
questions was of a technical nature and could not be answered because Mr B, 
who represented the BEC at the BAC meeting, was not a "technical person".129
bore serious financial and other implications and therefore the absence of a 
technical expert as a member (or at least technical input) at the meeting of the 
[BAC] obviously resulted in prejudice. Not only did it result in a decision being 
taken on a highly technical issue without the contribution or influence of the vote of 
an expert, but also the absence of technical advice and input resulted in the 
members and others who attended not being properly informed and not being able 
to properly apply their minds.
 
The court held that it was clear that the technical issue that was raised – 
 
130
The court found that the information provided by Mr B to the BAC "could by no 
stretch of the imagination be claimed to have amounted to an oral version of 
the 'report and recommendations' which the [BEC] had been supposed to 
submit and which the [BAC] had been supposed to consider".
 
 
131
                                            
126  Par 81, emphasis original. 
127  Par 82. 
128  Par 87, emphasis original. 
129  Par 94, emphasis original. 
130  Par 96. 
 The court 
131 Par 114, emphasis original. The court found no need to decide whether it was at all 
possible and in compliance with par 27(1)(d) and 29(1)(a) of the SCMP and Regulations 
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concluded that without a report and a full version of the recommendations of 
the BEC, it would not have been possible for the BAC members to have had a 
meaningful discussion or, in reality, to properly apply their minds to the 
complicated technical issues and the huge financial implications involved in the 
bids.132
The municipality had argued that even if the court decided that its decisions 
were reviewable, the court had to exercise its discretion against setting aside 
the decisions. The court, however, held that Actaris was entitled to have its bids 
properly evaluated and adjudicated. It would be reckless for the court to allow 
IMS to further execute the contracts in question when there were serious 
financial and technical matters that were on the face of it not considered in the 
award of the contracts. The court held that any possible prejudice that IMS may 
suffer was far outweighed by: the losses that the municipality would suffer if it is 
found that the costs of IMS's bids are significantly higher than would be 
necessary and justifiable; and the prejudice to Actaris through the unlawful 
rejection of its bids. The court accordingly set aside the three contracts 
awarded to IMS and ordered the municipality to reconsider the awards. The 
municipality and IMS had to pay the costs of Actaris' application jointly and 
severally.
  
 
133
3.4 The supervisory role of the municipal manager 
 
 
As noted above, the municipal manager is obliged to approve the bid 
specifications drafted by the BSC prior to the publication of the invitation for 
bids.134
                                                                                                                               
29(1)(a) and 29(1)(b) of the MSCM Regulations for a BEC to "submit" and a BAC to 
"consider" an oral version of the BEC's report and recommendations for the award of a bid. 
 The municipal manager also has a general supervisory role over the 
BEC and BAC. All three committees are, in other words, under the supervisory 
132  Par 118. See also National Treasury 2006 www.finance.gov.za/ par 4.4 which stipulates 
that "members of the BAC shall…apply their minds to matters at hand in order to take 
meaningful and accountable decisions". 
133  Par 139-151. 
134  MSCM reg 27(2)(g). 
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control of the municipal manager. What precisely, however, is the extent of the 
municipal manager's supervisory role over the three committees? In particular, 
is the municipal manager entitled to make changes to the specifications, 
conditions or the rules that have been laid down for conducting the process 
such as qualification, selection or adjudication criteria, or procedural rules 
relating to formalities for bids? Is the municipal manager entitled to instruct the 
BEC and BAC to evaluate and adjudicate bids based on such changes? In 
answering these questions, the unreported case of Ninham Shand (Pty) Limited 
v Municipal Manager City of Matlosana and Others135
3.4.1 The facts and judgment in Ninham  
 will be discussed, and 
suggestions will be made on the making of some of the changes mentioned. 
 
The municipality in Ninham called for bids for the appointment of consulting 
engineers for the design, bid documentation and project management for the 
construction of 14 400 toilets in four different areas. The bid invitation provided 
that bids would be adjudicated in accordance with the municipality's SCMP, 
which was based on the Procurement Act and the BBBEEA. Bidders would 
score points as follows: 70 points for price, 20 points for functionality and 10 
points for preference. A total of 26 bids were received and the BEC in its report 
to the BAC recommended the applicant as preferred bidder. On the facts of the 
case, however, it appears that the municipal manager was not satisfied with the 
point system used in the adjudication of bids and a letter was sent to all bidders 
proposing the use of a new point system. In terms of the new system, points 
would be allocated as follows: 30 points for specific project applicable 
expertise, 10 points for approach and methodology, 30 points for track record, 
20 points for price and 10 points for empowerment.136
                                            
135  Ninham Shand v Municipal Manager City of Matlosana (25911/2007) [2008] ZAGPHC 113 
(25 April 2008). Hereafter Ninham. 
 All the bidders, including 
136  In principle, this allocation of points would comply with the Procurement Act and 
Regulations, specifically the 90/10 point system in terms of which 90 points are allocated 
for price and 10 for preference. It is generally accepted that 'price' would include factors 
such as expertise; track record; the nature, quality and reliability of the product or service 
to be rendered; or in this particular case, also approach and methodology. See further 
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the applicant, were requested to provide the necessary information to facilitate 
the adjudication of bids based on the new criteria. The applicant and two other 
bidders objected to the use of the new criteria, arguing that there was not any 
valid reason for the amendment of the criteria and that the amendment was 
prejudicial to them. The bids were, however, re-adjudicated based on the new 
criteria. The applicant was again identified by the BEC as the highest scoring 
bidder, but in light of the timeframe for completing the project the BEC 
suggested a splitting of the bid between the four bidders scoring the highest 
points.137
When the splitting of the bid between the four bidders was communicated to 
them, the applicant objected thereto and argued that the bid should be awarded 
to it. The municipal manager then reasoned that under the circumstances there 
were valid and well-founded reasons to not award the bid and to re-advertise. 
All bidders who participated in the initial process were informed of the new bid 
invitation and the new criteria that would apply. The applicant did not participate 
in the new process and the bid was awarded to four bidders, that is, the third to 
sixth respondents. By the time the applicant approached the court for, inter alia, 
the review and setting aside of the municipal manager's decision to amend the 
adjudication criteria of the first call for bids and not to award the bid to the 
applicant, but to re-advertise and invite new bids, performance under the new 
contract was almost completed. The court reasoned, without giving judgment 
on the actions of the municipal manager, that the orders prayed for by the 
applicant, which included its appointment as preferred bidder under the first call 
for bids and the award of the bid to it, would result in chaos and prejudice to all 
the parties involved in the dispute as well as those not involved in the dispute 
but who are supposed to benefit from the project. The court noted that the 
applicant should have applied for an interdict at an earlier stage.
 
 
138
                                                                                                                               
section 3.2.1 on the meaning of the term "ability" with reference to the evaluation of 
bidders.  
137  Page 6 of the transcript. 
138  Pages 8-10 of the transcript. 
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3.4.2 Questions raised by Ninham and some suggestions 
The facts in Ninham raise questions on the precise extent of the municipal 
manager's supervisory role over the BSC, BEC and BAC. In particular, did the 
supervisory role of the municipal manager in Ninham entitle him to instruct the 
BEC to re-evaluate the bids based on different adjudication criteria, that is, a 
new point system? After all, MSCM Regulation 27(2)(g), as explained above, 
placed an obligation on him to approve the bid specifications, and this would 
include the adjudication criteria and point system, before the advertisement for 
bids.139 Strictly speaking, therefore, he was not in a position to change the 
adjudication criteria after the opening and adjudication of bids. At the same 
time, it can be argued that there may be compelling or legitimate reasons for 
making such changes. One example may be where new budgetary constraints 
necessitate a cutback in the scope of the project. Another may be where the 
municipality or municipal entity, at the behest of the municipal manager, 
realises that it has omitted an important award criterion that could generate 
better value for money. Possibilities for changing award criteria may, however, 
result in abuse: award criteria may be changed after it has become clear that a 
"favoured" bidder would not win, or unreasonable and incorrect award criteria 
may be advertised to deter competition with the aim to change these after the 
receipt of bids.140
Neither the MFMA nor the MSCM Regulations deal expressly with the 
possibility of changes to the specifications, conditions or the rules that have 
been laid down for conducting the process such as qualification, selection or 
adjudication criteria, or procedural rules relating to formalities for bids. It is 
submitted that a distinction should be drawn between changes that are material 
and those that are non-material.
  
 
141
                                            
139  This point was also raised by the applicant in Ninham. 
140  Arrowsmith Public and Utilities Procurement par 7.157. 
141  See also Arrowsmith (n 140) par 7.158; R v Portsmouth City Council Ex parte George 
Austin (Builders) unreported judgment of 6 June 1995. 
 The former would refer to changes that are 
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likely to have an impact on the identity of participating bidders and vice versa. If 
a municipality or municipal entity recognises the need to make a material 
change, it must return to a point in the bid process where it is certain that no 
prospective bidder is excluded because of the change. This suggestion is 
directly tied to the constitutional requirements of fairness, equity, transparency, 
competitiveness and cost-effectiveness in bid processes.  
If regard is had to the nature and extent of the changes that were made in 
Ninham to the advertised point system, it is clear that the changes made were 
material. Whereas under the advertised point system, 70 points were allocated 
for price, 20 for functionality and 10 for preference, the new system allocated 
30 points for specific project applicable expertise, 10 for approach and 
methodology, 30 for track record, 20 for price and 10 for empowerment. It is 
very likely that the new point system would have changed the identity of the 
participating bidders: new bidders may have participated and some of the 
already participating bidders may have decided not to participate. After 
adjudicating the bids based on the new point system, the municipal manager in 
Ninham of course decided to re-advertise for bids. The decision to re-advertise 
was, it is submitted, the correct approach (even though this decision was made 
only after the municipal manager tried to change the point system by 
communicating only with the existing participating bidders). The decision to re-
advertise ensured that new bidders were given an opportunity to participate, 
and gave effect to the requirements of fairness, equity, transparency, 
competitiveness and cost-effectiveness in bid processes. This does not 
however mean that re-advertisement is necessary in all cases, and that 
changes may never be communicated only to the participating bidders. If the 
changes made are non-material in that they are not likely to have an impact on 
the identity of participating bidders, the changes may be communicated only to 
participating bidders. An example of this may be where the original contract 
period advertised is extended by a few days. Such a change is unlikely to affect 
a contractor's decision to participate. Another example is where a municipality 
or municipal entity advertises a general request for proposals and thereafter 
restricts its bid invitation to a limited number of bidders. In such a case, 
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information that was not disclosed in the general request for proposals may be 
changed by communicating the changes only to the participating bidders.142
4 Conclusion 
  
 
 
In order for the different bid committees and the municipal manager to meet 
their obligations, it is important for committee members and the municipal 
manager to be familiar with and adhere to the relevant SCM legislation and to 
take heed of the National Treasury's guidelines and circulars. In light of recent 
court judgments, it is clear that the courts stress the importance of the roles and 
functions of the different committees. In Actaris South Africa (Pty) Ltd, the court 
reviewed and set aside three contracts awarded by the municipality, because 
the BEC and BAC were not properly constituted. The procedures within the two 
committees in evaluating and adjudicating the bids were also questionable. The 
judgment is important because it serves as a warning to municipalities to 
uphold and comply with the rules relating to the roles and composition of 
committees tasked with the evaluation and adjudication of bids. The rules 
relating to the appointment of committee members are there to ensure that, 
inter alia, the department that is directly affected by the outcome of the award 
has an opportunity to participate in the decision-making process. It is, as the 
court stated, crucial for the relevant department to play a role in the decision-
making process. It is, moreover, important for the BAC to be assisted by a 
technical expert. This is particularly important in cases where the contract in 
question is of a highly technical nature. In those instances where a municipality 
fails to ensure that membership of the BAC includes a technical expert in the 
relevant field, it would have to prove that such an expert did not exist within the 
municipality. It is also peremptory for the BEC to submit a report and 
recommendations to the BAC for the award of a bid. In the end, the municipal 
                                            
142  See also Arrowsmith (n 140) par 7.159. 
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manager has an obligation to ensure that the committees are properly 
constituted and that decisions are properly taken.  
 
The court in Actaris South Africa (Pty) Ltd can be applauded for affording 
peremptory status to the relevant provisions of the municipality's SCMP and the 
MSCM Regulations, in particular Regulation 28(2)(a) with respect to the 
membership of the BEC and that membership must hail from the department 
requiring the goods or services; Regulation 28(1)(d) with respect to the 
submission of a report and recommendations by the BEC to the BAC; and 
Regulation 29(2)(iii) with respect to membership of the BAC (including that 
membership must include an expert in the relevant field unless such expert 
does not exist within the municipality). Affording peremptory status to the 
different provisions serves a number of important purposes. It enhances the 
integrity of bid procedures and promotes public confidence. Effect is also given 
to the intention of the legislature in enacting the provisions, and general 
compliance with the purpose of the MFMA and MSCM Regulations is 
encouraged. 
 
The courts further stress the importance of the evaluation of bids in accordance 
with the bid specifications advertised, and for the contract with the preferred 
bidder to reflect such specifications. In Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality the 
court correctly set aside agreements concluded with the preferred bidder on the 
ground that they exceeded the scope of the bid invitation and the specifications 
advertised. The court in Ninham did not give judgment on the changing of the 
bid adjudication criteria by the municipal manager after the submission and 
evaluation of bids. As suggested, however, the decision of the municipal 
manager to re-advertise for bids was the correct approach. The changes made 
by him were material and could not be communicated only to the participating 
bidders.  
 
The decision to disqualify bidders is, furthermore, as indicated by the courts in 
Actaris South Africa (Pty) Ltd and Entsha Henra BK the prerogative of the 
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municipal manager. Neither a consultant, a municipal official, the BEC, BAC nor 
a mayoral committee can take this decision. 
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